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Then one winter evening they were sitting on the westernmost bench, in the hour 
before sunset. … Maya looked up … and clutched Sax by the arm, “Oh my God, 
look,” … Sax swallowed … “Ah,” he said, and stared. Everything was blue, sky blue, 
Terran sky blue, drenching everything for most of an hour, flooding their retinas and 
the nerve pathways in their brains, long starved no doubt for precisely that color, the 
home they had left forever.     (Robinson, 672-73)  
 
In a scene towards the end of the final book of Kim Stanley Robinson’s trilogy on the settling 
and terraforming of Mars, Blue Mars, two surviving members of the first one hundred 
settlers, now ageing despite their longevity treatments, have got into the habit of sitting 
looking at the sky. Using color charts, Sax and Maya put names to the new colors that they 
see slowly emerging in the Martian sky, as the planet is altered in order to make it more 
hospitable to life.  With their senses tuned by months of observation, they share wordlessly 
the moment when the color of an Earth sky finally appears. 
 
In this essay I will discuss the contemporary sociotechnical imaginary of climate 
geoengineering. If in the Anthropocene our own planet, as much as any other planet we may 
come to inhabit, becomes an intended world, one in which the majority of once-natural 
processes and systems are not just accidentally but deliberately shaped by human action, 
what would be the best word to capture its climates? “Engineered,” or “managed?” 
“Synthetic,” “made,” or “fabricated?”  “Assembled,” “composed,” or “designed?” Each 
candidate word has a slightly different resonance and set of micromeanings. In his lecture to 
the 2008 conference of the Design History Society, Bruno Latour made a case for ‘design’ as 
a fruitful way of describing human poiesis, making. He suggested that, unlike alternative 
words such as “building” and “constructing,” the notion of design implies a modest, post-
Promethean theory of action suitable for a context of ecological crisis. To support his case he 
highlighted five features of design: its humility; its attention to details; its focus on signs and 
meaning; its working with what already exists; and its normative distinction between good 
and bad design. According to Latour, then, the climate of an Anthropocene Earth would—or 
at least should—not be made, or constructed, but designed (“A cautious Prometheus?”).  
 
Yet Robinson’s passage above suggests that the word “design” might not be quite the right 
one to orient our thinking about what it would mean to make climates. In its linguistic origins 
in the Italian disegno, the notion of design was deeply shaped by the rivalry in the early and 
middle Renaissance between two regional aesthetic approaches to the visual arts, those of 
Florence (disegno, “design”) and Venice (colorito, “coloring”). To simplify a complex 
history, the Florentine style emphasised the artist’s conceptual mastery and technical skill, 
while the Venetian style focused more on observation and the conveying of vivid reality. The 
art of Florence thus typically started with outlines, to which were added individual hues using 
fresco and tempera paints, whereas the artists of Venice such as Titian—influenced by its 
maritime openness to the Byzantine East as well as by its damp climate—more typically used 
oils to build a composition from diffuse patches of colour in relationship to one other.  
 
In Blue Mars it is striking that the moment when these two ageing humans are convinced that 
Mars has somehow reached an Earth-like state is not through temperature readings, 
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atmospheric gas concentrations, or estimates of biomass but through an experience of color—
and then, not a technical matching of light frequencies but a visceral shock of recognition, the 
kind of speechless wonder that the ancient Greeks called thaumazein. In the end it is not the 
designing of Mars—the measuring of future sea levels, the building of colonies, the 
engineering of ecologies—but the emergent coloring of an evening sky that convinces the 
body that Mars has become a dwelling place for humans. This is why debates about 
geoengineering need to be informed by an environmental humanities sensibility. If humans 
ever come to make Earth climates, then we will need an expanded way of thinking about two 
things, both of which should inform the other: what it means to make or compose something, 
and what it would be like to live in a made or composed world. 
 
Geoengineering and the Disciplines 
 
Geoengineering, or climate engineering, is a prospective suite of techniques to control the 
climate in order to counteract the warming effects of raised carbon dioxide levels in the 
Earth’s atmosphere. Global climate control, as opposed to local, short-term weather control, 
was promoted by scientists such as John von Neumann and Edward Teller after World War 
II, during a period of heightened technological optimism and global sensibility. But it was an 
article by Nobel-prize-winning chemist Paul Crutzen in 2006 and a subsequent Royal Society 
report in 2009 that put geoengineering firmly on the research and policy agenda (Crutzen; 
Royal Society). Since then, scientific and “grey” publications have grown steadily (Belter and 
Seidel; Oldham et al.). Proposals under discussion generally fall into two classes: some 
techniques are about extracting CO2 from the atmosphere, either biologically or chemically; 
others are about making the Earth more reflective, whether by spraying sulphate particles into 
the stratosphere or brightening tropospheric clouds or the Earth’s surface, and thereby 
reducing the amount of solar energy getting through to warm the atmosphere.  
 
Geoengineering can provoke strong reactions, for reasons which have deep cultural roots. It 
can seem Promethean in the extreme to claim to be able to manage something as vast and 
complex as the global atmosphere (Hamilton). Proponents of the idea of a possible “good 
Anthropocene,” in which humans would aspire to new levels of the Baconian project of the 
mastery of nature and an “age of humanity,” often include geoengineering as a signature 
technology (e.g. Lynas). Geoengineering was shaped by a post-WWII, cold-war, and 
ultimately military imaginary (Fleming “The climate engineers”; Fleming Fixing the Sky; 
Masco), and can feel alienating and anti-democratic in character (Szerszynski et al.). Perhaps 
prompted by these concerns, policy debates about geoengineering were quicker to try to 
incorporate non-technical or “social” issues than those around earlier technological 
controversies (Schäfer and Low).  
 
Yet the research literature is dominated by science and engineering (Oldham et al.), and 
although there have been a number of interdisciplinary research projects on geoengineering, 
their style of interdisciplinarity has generally meant that natural-science framings of the issue 
still dominate (Szerszynski and Galarraga). The critical social-science research that has been 
carried out is often motivated by a desire to correct this tendency, by pointing out the danger 
of adopting a narrow set of problem definitions and expert-analytical assessment methods 
(e.g. Bellamy et al.), or by seeking to widen debates through techniques of public engagement 
(for a summary, see Bellamy and Lezaun).  
 
In the humanities, there have been publications about geoengineering in domains such as 
ethics (e.g. Jamieson; Gardiner), political theory (e.g. Dalby) and theology (e.g. Clingerman; 
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Kearnes). Some leading public commentators on geoengineering have themselves drawn on 
philosophical and historical forms of reasoning to try to deepen the debate (Hamilton; Hulme, 
Can Science Fix Climate Change?). Generally, contributions from the humanities have been 
deeply suspicious of geoengineering as a sociotechnical imaginary. But some have argued 
that it opens up a potentially interesting way of thinking about planetary politics, with Nigel 
Clark suggesting that it offers an opportunity “to imagine a new kind of geologic politics in 
which identity, citizenship, and governance are construed … in the relation to a dynamic and 
stratified earth” (Clark, 2831). 
 
What happens when you look at an issue that has been largely framed by science and 
engineering, using social science techniques, but informed by a humanities sensibility? In the 
rest of this chapter I will reflect on a line of work that explores geoengineering as the 
‘making of worlds’—and not just in the sense that it would be the fabrication of climates. 
Geoengineering would involve us in a deeper complicity in processes of anthropogenic 
climate change in the guise of promising to halt it, and thereby engender a new kind of 
relation between humans and the weather (Szerszynski). As Bill McKibben has argued, the 
meaning of everyday weather events has already changed due to unintended anthropogenic 
climate change: “Yes, the wind still blows—but no longer from some other sphere, some 
inhuman place” (McKibben, 44). How much more would that be the case with intentional 
“climate control”? How would geoengineering color our relationship with the air, and what 
sort of world would it bring about? 
 
Coloring the Sky  
 
In 2012 Maialen Galarraga and I published a philosophical paper on geoengineering. Using 
the term ‘making’ in an inclusive way to describe all forms of poiesis, the deliberate en-
forming of matter, we tried to approach making as something that has to be grasped as a 
whole rather than decomposed into a set of technical questions on the one hand and a set of 
ethical, political or aesthetic questions on the other. We drew on the philosophy of 
technology to develop three very different accounts of how making takes place, which we 
called respectively production (imposing existing forms onto matter), eduction (drawing 
forms out of the potentiality of matter), and creation (creating radically new forms by 
rearrangements of matter). We argued that each of these models of making implies a 
particular version of human agents and their responsibility, which in the case of 
geoengineering we called the “climate architect,” the “climate artisan,” and the “climate 
artist” respectively. These are not concrete individual people but archetypes that shape 
imaginations and actions and thus the way the future unfolds. 
 
The climate architect is our name for the picture of the maker of climate that currently 
dominates the contemporary discourse of geoengineering. The climate architect is an 
idealised, imagined figure who ‘designs’ in advance the form that they want the climate to 
take; who can identify the process whereby they can provoke the climate to take it; and who 
can carry out that process and bring the matter of climate into the desired form (for more on 
this model of making, see Simondon, L’Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, 48-9; 
Protevi, 8). This way of thinking about making climates is encouraged by the centrality of 
computer models in climate science, including geoengineering research, which has the effect 
of rendering climate as pure information in silico—as form stripped of matter. This 
dematerialised, formal climate can then be imagined as something that can be recombined 




But it is a mistake to imagine that a predetermined form can be imposed onto the metastable 
climate system. In Gilbert Simondon’s well-known analysis of brick-making, the process of 
en-forming the clay with the help of a mould is dependent on the clay having been purified—
for example, by removing any clots or stones that would act as “parasitic singularities” and 
disrupt the process of en-forming (Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, 
42). Yet the climate, continually in formation, cannot be purified in this way. The 
uncertainties in climate models are not mere ‘noise’ to be erased, but the result of 
potentialities intrinsic to the way that the atmosphere maintains and develops its form over 
time, in interaction with incoming solar energy and the other dynamic ‘compartments’ of the 
Earth including the biosphere.  
 
So secondly, we discussed an alternative way to imagine the making of climates, not 
“production” but “eduction”: coaxing out the latent forms in matter. The imaginary figure 
who would make climates in this way, the climate artisan, would focus less on the final form 
to be taken by the climate than on the process whereby the en-forming of climate takes place. 
Adopting a greater humility towards the desires and tendencies of the more-than-human 
world, both biotic and abiotic, out of which climate occurs as a collective achievement, they 
would allow the ‘form’ of the made climate to emerge out of their interactions with matter.  
They would thus emphasise recursive learning, and treat computer models not as “truth 
machines” which reveal the future but as experimental arenas in which the beginnings of a 
“feeling for climate” might be cultivated.   
 
But we suggested that even the artisanal approach has its limitations. As ideal types, neither 
the climate architect nor the climate artisan is oriented towards the radical novelty that 
making climates might entail. So we developed a third figure, the climate artist. This was a 
deliberately provocative move, in that a climate artist might become a ‘climate auteur’, even 
more hubristic than the climate architect about their capacity to design every feature of a 
geoengineered world, while also being unconstrained by the demands of technical 
effectiveness.  But we tried to avoid this by loading onto this third figure an even greater set 
of responsibilities – not just to the final form of a made climate, or to the matter out of which 
it would be composed, but also to the way that major technological innovations like 
geoengineering can fundamentally alter the human condition. In our normative typology the 
climate artist would thus approach the making of climates as an act of “creation” in the sense 
used by Cornelius Castoriadis. For Castoriadis, “producing” artefacts in the sense discussed 
above is not really making anything new but merely imitating, because it is simply re-
producing existing forms (Castoriadis, 197). It is only if we create a new form or eidos that 
genuine novelty or “ontological genesis” occurs. Understanding making as creation also 
requires us to understand time as genuinely historical; just as some works of art inaugurate a 
new way of looking at the world – and even at earlier works of art – according to Castoriadis 
each new form of society is the emergence of a new eidos, or societal imaginary—a radically 
new way of organising thought and action. Being a “climate artist” would thus involve not 
only an artisanal awareness of the need to collaborate with one’s material, but also an artistic 
awareness that making climate would inevitably involve creating climatically novel states—
climates and therefore biomes with no historical analogues—and also historically novel 
states: a new kind of society, with a new articulation of the atmosphere and how we relate to 
it. 
 
The implications of this are profound. Both the climate architect and the climate artisan as we 
have imagined them assume that it is possible to maintain some kind of continuity and 
consistency between a goal formed in advance and the final achievement of a made climate. 
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But the climate artist would recognise that the creation of a new eidos produces a historical 
rupture, a new context in which ways of thinking and forming intentions can be utterly 
transformed. Seeing geoengineering as creation means that it could never simply be judged as 
a means to an end, and thus as capable of being deemed “successful” or “unsuccessful” by 
criteria set in advance in the way that is envisaged by most scientists and policy actors.  
Instead, its deployment would have “changed the end in changing the means” (Latour, 
“Morality and Technology”, 252); it would create a new kind of society, in which 
geoengineering would take on new meanings, be put to new uses, and be judged in new ways, 
and in which the very nature of climate, the sky, and the weather for us would be altered. 
This is where the sensibilities of colorito become relevant. Just as the great colorito paintings 
of the Renaissance, or the skies later painted by Turner, are concerned less with extensive 
outline and shape and more with intensive atmosphere, so too would the climate artist as we 
imagined them be concerned not so much with the achievement of specific climate 
parameters as with wider features of society, culture and subjectivity in a geoengineered 
world. To reflect on these aspects of climate engineering one has to move, as it were, from 
Florence to Venice, from tempera to oils.   
 
Reflecting (on) the Sky  
 
If Sax and Maya were to look at the sky of a geoengineered Earth, what would they see? 
Perhaps stratospheric aerosol injection would have turned the deep blue skies of rural areas 
into a Parisian-style white haze—but also have made dramatic fiery sunsets like the 
Krakatoa-induced one painted by Edvard Munch in The Scream entirely routine. Perhaps 
continuous sprays of seawater droplets would have turned the grey stratocumulus clouds that 
flank western-facing continental coastlines a dazzling white—or, more disturbingly, the 
leaden monsoon skies of South Asia may have become less common. But let us also expand 
our gaze beyond the literally visual: what of the wider ‘colors’ of a geoengineered world? 
What kind of people and societies would live under and be illuminated by these altered skies? 
And might they view all weather events differently? I explored such questions in a project 
with the science and technology studies scholar Phil Macnaghten, in which we adapted public 
engagement methods in order to explore questions about the governability of geoengineering 
in the context of a collective, phenomenological exploration of what it would be like to live 
in a world shaped by geoengineering. 
 
This approach was informed by the philosophy of technology and art as discussed above, but 
also by historical and sociological insights about technological change. Major shifts in 
technology are not simply the insertion of a new tool into an existing society; they change 
that society, subtly or drastically altering what people want and feel entitled to, and how 
social practices and social relations are organised (Nordmann). If you change the means, you 
can change the ends (Latour, “Morality and Technology”). We thus felt that asking the public 
what they thought about adding geoengineering to the existing world would be the wrong 
question, one which was likely to get us a familiar but misleading answer. By adding 
geoengineering to the world, you are likely to change that world in a profound way.   
 
We carried out seven focus-group discussions in three UK cities in December 2011, each 
lasting three hours, and each with six to eight participants sharing a particular set of lifeworld 
characteristics. What first emerged was a phenomenon that is familiar from other studies of 
public attitudes to new technologies—”conditional acceptance.” Participants expressed a 
reluctant acceptance of research into geoengineering as a necessary evil, given the 
geopolitical realities around emissions-reduction negotiations. But they were only happy for 
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this research to go ahead if they were given reason to have greater confidence in climate 
science, in geoengineering research, in geoengineering governance structures, and in wider 
political institutions.  
 
We then asked our participants to put those conditions of acceptance—and the dominant 
imaginaries of key scientists, policy-makers, civil society actors involved in geoengineering 
debates—to a plausibility test by imagining future geoengineered worlds. Drawing on earlier 
experiments with storytelling techniques in public engagement about the future (Roberts), 
participants were encouraged to imagine the worlds that might be brought about by these 
technologies—their political economy, their institutions, their inhabitants, their lifeworld. 
Thus, rather than asking them to accept or reject the implicit imaginaries of policy makers 
and scientists, they were encouraged to carry out their own imaginings; and rather than 
simply picturing geoengineering as being added to the world that is, they tried to render the 
interconnected colors of a geoengineering world. 
 
In such a world, in which the reality of geoengineering had percolated through to many 
aspects of society and culture, the “climate architect” imaginary of policymakers became 
implausible. In a geoengineering world, the existing problems identified with the public 
meanings of climate mitigation—alienation, dependence on science, and truth claims that are 
seen as at odds with the everyday experience of the limits of human knowledge and control 
(Wynne)—were intensified. And the possible side effects of geoengineering that were 
highlighted were not confined to the realm of the physical; our visioning exercises enabled us 
to paint a picture of a world in which immense challenges were being posed to the institutions 
of liberal democratic politics.  
 
We summarised and expanded on these in a subsequent paper (Szerszynski et al.). We argued 
firstly that with geoengineering the attribution of cause and effect, and of liability and 
accountability, would be impossible to carry out in any definitive way, putting strains on the 
international system and further politicising scientific knowledge in ways that would impact 
on the broader politics of climate change (see Hulme, “Climate intervention schemes” for an 
imaginative rendering of a possible geoengineered future). Secondly, we suggested that, 
because the emerging “social constitution” of geoengineering—its implied social relations—
would be global in scale and technocratic in character, it would be experienced as 
incompatible with democratic control. Thirdly, we argued that, in the transition to a world of 
‘made’ climates, the relationship between intention, deployment, and consequences would 
always be unstable: a new, geoengineered and geoengineering world would be one with new 
senses of possibility, in which geoengineering technologies would be used for new purposes 
such as improving agricultural yields or undermining regimes, leading to new kinds of 
conflict and controversy. Fourthly, we suggested that geoengineering would become 
conditioned by economic forces, with artificial markets, promissory, “vision-based” 
dynamics and “bubbles” of hope and hype, generating further problematic effects on the 
practice and authority of science. The novelty of a geoengineered world when fully imagined 
thus lie not just in the geophysical realm, nor in the felt subjective experience of the weather, 




We have seen that geoengineering raises complex issues about the unfolding of 
sociotechnical futures, ones for which a narrow “climate architect” imaginary is inadequate. 
Yet in the mainstream debates about geoengineering, it is still that very imaginary which 
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prevails. If we genuinely want creatively to explore the space that geoengineering has opened 
up for new forms of politics suitable for living on a dynamic planet, we will have to develop 
a broader palette of imaginaries. For a start, we will need to explore more artisanal techniques 
of climate alteration, with very different implied social relations – for example, locally 
implemented and easily reversible “soft geoengineering” techniques such as building soils 
and increasing the reflectance of cities (Olson), or more “enchanted” options such as 
rewilding landscapes and creating biophilic cities (Buck). But we also need a sense of climate 
responsibility with deeper and richer hues, a wider culture of climate artistry.   
 
Where can we find the sort of cultural politics of climate-making that could generate the 
reflections that we need? Geoengineering has featured in popular news media, but coverage 
has been limited both in scale and in the range of narratives and metaphors deployed 
(Luokkanen, Huttunen and Hildén). In wider popular culture it has received more sustained 
and complex treatment. It figured prominently in the 1982 graphic novel Le Transperceneige 
(Lob and Rochette), later translated into English and adapted as the 2013 film Snowpiercer 
(Bong), though this focused more on the (in this case disastrous) possible after-effects of 
geoengineering. The kind of judgements that would be involved in real-time climate 
modification itself have been foregrounded in a number of interactive games. In the computer 
game Fate of the World (Red Redemption), players can try out various options including 
geoengineering in order to reduce or adapt to global warming over the period of two centuries 
(Red Redemption). In the transmedia role-playing game Bluebird, sponsored by the 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation in 2010, Bluebird was the name of a “rogue” 
geoengineering project initiated by fictional billionaire “Harrison Wyld;” players were able to 
live life for six weeks as if geoengineering was really happening and could engage in the 
struggle between the “Go Bluebird” PR campaign and the “Stop Bluebird” group set up by 
whistlebower “Kyle Vandercamp.” Artists such as Bigert & Bergström, Karolina Sobecka 
and Weather Permitting have also produced works that raise more open-ended questions 
about what a geoengineered world would be like. 
 
If we do ever come to make climates, it will never be the simple commanding of matter, since 
it will entangle us even more deeply in the endless becoming of the more-than-human world. 
Making climates will thus have to be a form of what Tim Ingold calls “textilic” rather than 
“architectonic” making, “a weaving of, and through, active materials” (Ingold, 93). But it will 
also have to be sensitive to the ontological dimension of making climates, which will 
necessarily be more than the mere rearrangement of existing elements; it will be the creation 
of a new world, in which the very nature of air as “matter-that-takes-form” will have been 
altered.  We may never be able to “design” a planet—but we may yet come to “color” one—




Note: I am particularly grateful to Maialen Galarraga and Phil Macnaghten, my primary 
collaborators in the research discussed in this chapter, for all the conversations we have had 
over the years, without which my thinking about geoengineering would have been much the 
poorer. I also thank Monika Bakke, Holly Buck, Forrest Clingerman, Alan Cottey, Matt 
Edgeworth, Andrea Gammon, Ursula Heise, Anne Kull, Michelle Niemann, Lisa Sideris and 







Bellamy, Rob, Jason Chilvers, Naomi E. Vaughan, and Timothy M. Lenton. “A review of 
climate geoengineering appraisals.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 
3.6 (2012): 597-615. Print. 
Bellamy, Rob, and Javier Lezaun. “Crafting a public for geoengineering.” Public 
Understanding of Science  (2015): 1-16. Print. 
Belter, Christopher W. , and Dian J. Seidel. “A bibliometric analysis of climate engineering 
research.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 4.5 (2013): 417-27. 
Print. 
Snowpiercer. Dir. Bong, Joon-Ho. 2013. Movie. CJ Entertainment. 
Buck, Holly Jean. “On the possibilities of a charming Anthropocene.” Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers 105.2 (2014): 369-77. Print. 
Castoriadis, Cornelius. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Trans. Blamey, Kathleen. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987. Print. 
Clark, Nigel. “Geoengineering and geologic politics.” Environment and Planning A 45.12 
(2013): 2825-32. Print. 
Clingerman, Forrest. “Geoengineering, theology, and the meaning of being human.” Zygon: 
Journal of Religion and Science 49.1 (2014): 6-21. Print. 
Crutzen, Paul J. “Albedo enhancement by stratospheric sulfur injections: a contribution to 
resolve a policy dilemma?” Climatic Change 77.3-4 (2006): 211-20. Print. 
Dalby, Simon. “Geoengineering: the next era of geopolitics?” Geography Compass 9.4 
(2015): 190-201. Print. 
Fleming, James Rodger. “The climate engineers: playing God to save the planet.” Wilson 
Quarterly 31.2 (2007): 46-60. Print. 
---. Fixing the Sky: The Checkered History of Weather and Climate Control. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2010. Print. 
Gardiner, Stephen. “Is “arming the future” with geoengineering really the lesser evil? Some 
doubts about the ethics of intentionally manipulating the climate system.” Climate 
Ethics: Essential Readings. Eds. Gardiner, Stephen, et al. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010. 284-314. Print. 
Hamilton, Clive. Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering. New Haven, 
CN: Yale University Press, 2013. Print. 
Hulme, Mike. Can Science Fix Climate Change?: A Case Against Climate Engineering. 
Oxford: Polity, 2014. Print. 
---. “Climate intervention schemes could be undone by geopolitics”.  2010. Yale Environment 
360. 27 September 2015. 
<http://e360.yale.edu/feature/climate_intervention_schemes_could_be_undone_by_ge
opolitics/2283/>. 
Ingold, Tim. “The textility of making.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 34.1 (2010): 91-
102. Print. 
Jamieson, Dale. “Ethics and intentional climate change.” Climatic Change 33.3 (1996): 323-
36. Print. 
Kearnes, Matthew. “Miraculous engineering and the climate emergency: climate 
modification as divine economy “ Technofutures, Nature and the Sacred: 
Transdisciplinary Perspectives. Eds. Deane-Drummond, Celia, Sigurd Bergmann and 
Bronislaw Szerszynski. Farnham: Ashgate, 2015. 219-37. Print. 
Latour, Bruno. “A cautious Prometheus? A few steps toward a philosophy of design (with 
special attention to Peter Sloterdijk).” Networks of Design. Eds. Hackney, Fiona, 
8 
 
Jonathan Glynne and Viv Minton. Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers, 2008. 2-10. 
Print. 
---. “Morality and technology: the end of the means.” Theory, Culture and Society 19.5/6 
(2002): 247-60. Print. 
Lob, Jacques, and Jean-Marc Rochette. Le Transperceneige. Tournai: Casterman, 1982. Print. 
Luokkanen, Matti, Suvi Huttunen, and Mikael Hildén. “Geoengineering, news media and 
metaphors: framing the controversial.” Public Understanding of Science 23.8 (2014): 
966-81. Print. 
Lynas, Mark. The God Species: How the Planet Can Survive the Age of Humans. London: 
Fourth Estate, 2011. Print. 
Masco, Joseph. “Bad weather: on planetary crisis.” Social Studies of Science 40.1 (2010): 7-
10. Print. 
McKibben, Bill. The End of Nature. London: Penguin, 1990. Print. 
Nordmann, Alfred. “Responsible innovation, the art and craft of anticipation.” Journal of 
Responsible Innovation 1.1 (2014): 87-98. Print. 
Oldham, Paul, Bronislaw Szerszynski, Jack Stilgoe, Calum Brown, Bella Eacott, and Andy 
Yuille. “Mapping the landscape of climate engineering.” Philosophical Transactions 
of the Royal Society A 372.2031 (2014): 20140065. Print. 
Olson, Robert L. “Soft geoengineering: a gentler approach to addressing climate change.” 
Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 54.5 (2012): 29-39. 
Print. 
Protevi, John. Political Physics: Deleuze, Derrida and the Body Politic. London: Athlone 
Press, 2001. Print. 
Red Redemption. Fate of the World. Vers. 2011. 
Roberts, Thomas Campbell. “Tales of power: public and policy narratives on the climate and 
energy crisis.” PhD. Lancaster University, 2010. Print. 
Robinson, Kim Stanley. Blue Mars. London: HarperCollins, 1996. Print. 
Royal Society. Geoengineering the Climate: Science, Governance and Uncertainty. London: 
The Royal Society, 2009. Print. 
Schäfer, Stefan, and Sean Low. “Asilomar moments: formative framings in recombinant 
DNA and solar climate engineering research.” Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society of London A 372.2031 (2014): 20140064. Print. 
Simondon, Gilbert. Du mode d’existence des objets techniques. third ed. Paris: Aubier, 1989. 
Print. 
---. L’Individu et sa genèse physico-biologique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964. 
Print. 
Szerszynski, Bronislaw. “Reading and writing the weather: climate technics and the moment 
of responsibility.” Theory, Culture & Society 27.2-3 (2010): 9-30. Print. 
Szerszynski, Bronislaw, and Maialen Galarraga. “Geoengineering knowledge: 
interdisciplinarity and the shaping of climate engineering research.” Environment and 
Planning A 45.12 (2013): 2817-24. Print. 
Szerszynski, Bronislaw, Matthew Kearnes, Phil Macnaghten, Richard Owen, and Jack 
Stilgoe. “Why Solar Radiation Management geoengineering and democracy won’t 
mix.” Environment and Planning A 45.12 (2013): 2809-16. Print. 
Wynne, Brian. “Strange weather, again: climate science as political art.” Theory, Culture & 
Society 27.2-3 (2010): 289-305. Print. 
 
 
9 
 
